By: Nabi Sonboli
Source; Global Research
http://www.globalresearch.ca/nuclear-weapons-who-needs-red-lines-iran-or-israel/
In his September 23, 2012 speech at the United
Nations General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked the
United States and its allies to define clear red lines for the Iranian nuclear
program, emphasizing that Iran will reach the threshold at which it could
manufacture a nuclear bomb by mid 2013. A deep scrutiny of the past and of
present events and trends tells a different story.
After Iraq’s defeat in the 1990 war in Kuwait,
Israeli officials focused on the Iranian nuclear program as the main threat to
Israel security. At first they alleged that Iran had bought nuclear weapon
components from the former Soviet Republics. Then they put aside that argument
and stressed that Iran was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, and would reach
that target within a few years and requested that the U.S. and EU to do
everything possible to prevent Tehran from achieving that goal. Israel had
sufficient influence in the U.S. to see sanctions imposed on the Iranian oil
industry in mid the 1990s. But European powers that were tired of following the
U.S. and Israeli lead after the end of the Cold War were not prepared to accept
these arguments. They improved their relations with Tehran and consequently the
attempt to apply U.S. laws regarding Iran extraterritorially failed.
However, the Israeli lobby succeeded in
convincing the U.S. of the threat posed by Iraq. Sanctions and military attacks
against Iraq continued until that country was invaded by a U.S.-UK arranged
coalition in 2003. During the presidency of G.W. Bush, Israel benefited from
the support of Neo-conservatives who held high office in his administration.
Tel Aviv put aside the peace process and launched military attacks against
Lebanon in 2006, Syria in 2007 and Gaza in 2009. Israel also encouraged the
U.S. to put increased military and economic pressure on Iran. To satisfy
Israel, the Bush administration undermined the “EU3’s” negotiations with
Tehran, and constantly emphasized that “all options were on the table”[1].
However, the U.S. administration was hamstrung, because of the situation in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, realities weakened the Neoconservatives and
brought Realists back to power in Washington. The bipartisan Iraqi Study Group
recommended negotiation with Iran to stabilize Iraq.
The Bush administration found a clever method by
which to deflect Israeli pressure and Neoconservative rhetoric. After years of
emphasizing that “all options were on the table,” the administration had two
options- either: (i) to implement their threats or (ii) to take the military
option off of the table. The U.S. also gradually began to feel the economic
consequences of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at home and was therefore not
able to launch another war. President Bush did not change his position but the
U.S. intelligence agencies rather acted to remove the urgency of the Iranian
threat. In 2007 the U.S. intelligence community published a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear
weapons program in 2003. The NIE paved the way for the U.S. to negotiate with
Tehran in Baghdad and to join in the nuclear negotiations with Tehran.
The U.S. intelligence community’s position on
Iran’s nuclear program has not changed. Moreover, the current positions of Iran
and the U.S. are compatible with one another. The U.S. emphasizes that Iran be
prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons, while Iran emphasizes its right as a
signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to enrich nuclear fuel. The NPT
accommodates both of these sets of interests. Consequently Iran and the U.S.
have a common basis for negotiation.
During the Bush administration, the Israeli
lobby in the United States succeeded in imposing a red line on U.S.
conservative establishment policy that was illegal under international law. And
that was to insist that no enrichment take place in Iran. The Obama
administration changed this redline to one compliant with international law,
whereby Iran not be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. The swap agreement
[2] that was proposed and then rejected by the U.S. included tacit agreement to
the idea that nuclear fuel could continue to be enriched in Iran. In the recent
nuclear negotiations with Iran that took place in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow,
the EU3+3 have also tacitly accepted that the enrichment of nuclear fuel in
Iran can continue; the negotiators have asked that Tehran refrain from
enriching nuclear fuel up to the twenty percent purity level—even though such
enrichment is legal under the International law.
The Israeli position continues to differ from
that of the U.S. and the EU3+3. Tel Aviv emphasizes denying nuclear technology
to Iran, but its main target is actually to weaken Iran irrespective of the
state of Iran’s nuclear program. Israel’s main problem is not with Iran but
with its immediate neighbors. Tel Aviv has lost its control over its
neighborhood and cannot influence the situation there. At a minimum, Israel
feels besieged by new, unknown forces. By emphasizing the Iranian nuclear issue
Israel is pursuing two goals: (i) to create a new (Iranian-Israeli) conflict so
that (ii) the world forgets the old (Arab-Israeli) one.
Due to the fact that Arab governments are
concerned about the Iranian nuclear program and Iranian regional influence,
Israel has somehow been able to create a loose Arab-Israeli alliance against
Iran. We should not forget that Arabs did not condemn the Israeli military
actions against Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas in 2009. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are
more concerned about Iran than about Israel. The Syrian conflict and
Saudi-Qatari support for extremists there demonstrate this very clearly. The
question is, if the extremists succeed in Syria, who will their next targets
be? Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or the U.S.? This is why the U.S. and EU
are hesitant about intervening in Syria.
What Israel fears most is not Iran but being
left to its own devices by the West in an instable region. For the first time,
Israel really feels isolated in the region. Because of their internal economic
problems, the EU and the U.S. are not capable of defending Israel by going to
war. Israel has lost both its supremacy in the region and the commitment of its
allies. What Israel is seeking to achieve is to keep the U.S. and EU engaged in
the region by maneuvering them into launching another war. For Israel, the
costs of the war and the degree of success it achieves are secondary issues.
The main objective is a long-term U.S. and EU commitment and involvement in the
conflict on Israel’s side.
Israeli security is important for the U.S. and
EU but not more important than their own interests. The U.S. knows very well
that, if the Israelis attack Iran, the U.S. has no option but join them. If
they do so, however, they will not be able to defend their own interests. The
U.S. has great military power, but many vulnerable interests as well. The EU’s
vulnerabilities are even more pronounced than those of the U.S. Consequently,
long-term conflict in the Middle East will be too costly for the U.S. and EU to
tolerate.
Iranian behavior during the past decade
demonstrates that Tehran is not seeking nuclear weapons. By implementing the
Additional Protocol to the NPT from 2003 to 2005 and by subsequently resolving
outstanding issues with the IAEA, Iran demonstrated that its nuclear program is
peaceful. Iran’s religious leader has issued a fatwa against the acquisition of
nuclear weapons as a clear demonstration of Iran’s future intentions. This
fatwa has the capacity to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) in Muslim countries and to prevent the use of such a weapons by Islamic
groups.
After years of intervention, sanctions,
political pressure, covert warfare and cyber- attacks, Iran has much more
reason to be concerned about the real intentions of Israel, the U.S. and its
allies than the latter have to be concerned about those of Iran. A nuclear
capacity has simply provided a minor form of reinsurance of Iran’s security; it
does not deter any attack on Iran. But those who intend to attack Iran, should
think twice or more. Iranians have now understood the importance attached to
such a nuclear capacity in U.S. and Israeli military calculations. This shows
that a peaceful nuclear capacity can also contribute to peace and stability—it
is not even necessary to have nuclear weapons in order to deter rational
enemies.
If we compare the behavior of Iranian and
Israeli leaders, we can easily conclude that Iranian behavior has been much
more rational. Voluntary cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
implementation of the modality agreement, acceptance of the swap proposal,
cooperation and negotiation with the U.S. to bring peace and stability to Iraq
and Afghanistan are all clear indicators of rational behavior in Tehran. If any
of the Western countries had faced the threats and pressures that Iran faces,
they would surely have behaved differently. Israel will not be able to achieve
sustainable peace by force in the new Middle East. Regional concerns about
Iran’s nuclear program can be solved through regional security dialogue. Iran
has always supported bilateral and multilateral dialogue with neighboring
countries.
U.S. and Israeli options are limited: accept an
Iranian nuclear enrichment capacity under the IAEA control or strike and then
accept the reconstitution of the same capacity outside of IAEA control. It took
many years for the U.S. to change its position from no enrichment to low
enrichment. Israel has not yet been able to make up its mind. Someone needs to
go to Tel Aviv and help Israelis comprehend that Iran’s nuclear capacity is a
reality and that Iran is a rational player. The existence of such a capacity in
the hands of a rational player that has been engaged and integrated at the
regional and global levels, will be different from its existence in the hands
of a player that has been attacked by all means. Sanctions, cyber attacks,
isolation, and the terrorization of Iranian nuclear scientists have simply
exacerbated the situation and led to a loss of Western influence on Iran.
The Middle East is already unstable enough.
Israel has just one option: accept the new realities, change its behaviors and
look for sustainable peace. During the last decade the U.S. and its allies were
the main losers due to instability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Economic and social
instability paved the way for moderate Islamists to come to power, but if the
instability continues to grow, they will not be able to solve problems and keep
their positions. Extremists are at the gate from North Africa to Central and South
Asia. These developments have limited U.S. and Israeli freedom of action in the
Middle East, not the Iranian nuclear program.
If being moderate or extremist is a criterion
for being entitled to possess a nuclear capability, then Israel clearly fails,
as it currently has a most extreme government. That is why EU and the US should
set a red line for Israel and not let it to impose its policies on them. In
recent weeks Israeli officials have repeatedly talked about a military strike
against Iran and Western countries have mostly remained silent. Extremists in
Israel have clearly demonstrated their intention and if they strike Iranian
nuclear facilities, Western officials cannot say that they have not been
informed. Those who provide all kinds of weapons for Israel have more
responsibility. Just as in the case of the ongoing economic war against Iran,
innocent people will be the main victims of any military strike. The Iranian
nuclear program enjoys strong national support. U.S., Israeli and EU pressures
target Iranian nation, nationalism in Iran and will have long-term consequences
for the West.
Netanyahu’s request at the UN General Assembly
strengthened the well-established belief in the Middle East that Israel and its
lobbies determine European and American policies toward the region. With this
opinion widespread in the Middle East, Washington and Brussels will not benefit
from Arab Spring. It is time for Western countries to stop Israel from
intervening in their domestic and foreign policies and for them distinguish
between values and interests that they do and do not share with Israel.
Netanyahu’s speech in the UNGA demonstrated his arrogant approach toward the
West. If Western powers cannot control Israel, it will impose at least another
three trillion dollars in costs upon them. During the past decades, Israeli
officials have followed one imaginary enemy after another: Palestine, Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and now Iran are among the list and it will extend to
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This approach needs to be
stopped. The U.S. and EU need to clearly impose the following redlines on
Israel:
First: Do not interfere in U.S. and EU politics.
Western officials are wise enough to recognize their interests and know how to
decide.
Second: Occupation, intervention, violation of
Palestinian rights, and the terrorization of scientists are not values and
interests that Israel, the U.S. and EU share in common. Tel Aviv must desist
from these policies.
Third: A regime which has manufactured nuclear
weapons and is not a member of the NPT does not have right to tell an NPT
member state what to do.
Fourth: A regime that has repeatedly attacked
its neighbors during the past five decades cannot accuse a peaceful nation of
having such an intention.
Fifth: Israeli officials should not mislead the
international community. It is twenty years that they have been saying that
Iran will reach nuclear weapons within a few years. All those years have passed
without any nuclear weapon and the next year will also end in the same way.
Sixth: The U.S. and EU are no longer ready to
pay the price for Israeli mistakes. Because of past unconditional support,
Israel has repeatedly attacked its neighbors and has not learned how to live
with them.
Seventh: Preventing war is a global
responsibility and the international community will stop Israel from launching
another one.
Solving the Iranian nuclear issue has never been
complicated. Transparency for recognition is still the best solution. Iran is
ready to increase transparency if the other parties to the EU3+3 negotiations
negotiate seriously. Iran has not rejected re-implementing the Additional
Protocol either. A transparent nuclear program will not endanger anyone’s
security. Many countries around the world have such a capacity, including
Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and Brazil. Iran has no
problem with transparency; the problem is that the U.S. and some of its allies
have not been able to recognize Iran’s rights, role and interests. The U.S. has
tried to exclude Iran from any regional and international mechanism. They have
just tactically engaged Iran in some cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
Israeli pressure has been an important factor, but we should not neglect other
domestic and international elements. Iranophobia is not limited to Israeli
extremists. Many people, even some elites, in the West suffer from a distorted
image of Iran. Reinforcing closed doors by sanctions, isolation, military
threats, and cyber attacks will not lead to transparency and cooperation. All
sides need to pave the way for doors to open.
Notes:
[1] i.e. including a possible military attack on
Iran
[2] whereby nuclear fuel enriched to
twenty-percent purity in Iran would be shipped out of Iran in exchange for
enriched nuclear fuel to power the Tehran Research reactor (TRR) supplied from
abroad
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